p.p1 groups and the long-term prediction of their

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The definition and evaluation of the “political qualifications” of domination groups and the long-term prediction of their actions constitute the paramount task of strategic analysis, which has several facets and can be addressed through various approaches and means.
Ken Buz in his work “Strategic culture: reliability and its definition” suggests that the strategic culture determines the patterns of behavior in solving the problems of war and peace. It does not determine how actors will interact with other actors in the security sphere, but it helps to form an overall picture of this interaction. Other explanations play a greater or lesser role under specific circumstances.
The concept of strategic culture helps build a model of behavior in such areas as the use of force in international politics, sensitivity to external threats, civil-military relations, and the formulation of the most strategic doctrine.
As a result of the continuity of the existence of these problems, one can legitimately speak of individual “styles” in the theory and practice of strategy.
The study and verification of the authenticity of the concept of strategic culture will always be intellectually challenging. The application of this concept will remain an art rather than a science; like most major dimensions of international politics, its provisions will never be quantifiable. However, the concept under consideration is key and its ignoring can lead to a threat, for example, for academic reputation or even for national security.
there are six main reasons that explain the significance of the concept of strategic culture.
First, it destroys the impact of ethnocentrism on everything that implies the theory and practice of strategy. Ethnocentrism affects strategic interaction in various ways, but its results are most evident in the wrong perception of each other by strategic actors.
Secondly, the understanding of strategic culture is a fundamental part of one of the basic principles of war: “Having learned your enemy, you will know yourself.” This helps the strategic actor evaluate his behavior according to his own characteristics, which is the starting point of understanding.
Thirdly, it should be noted the way related to the previous one, by which the strategic culture draws our attention to the importance of history, if we want to ask the right questions about motivation, self-image, and about the patterns of behavior of others.
Fourthly, it helps to break the artificial border between the internal environment within which the policy is implemented, and the external security environment. This reminds us that decision-making structures, military institutions, decision-making processes – all this functions in special political cultures. That is why strategic culture draws attention to the differences between national states, while “scientific” in political science seeks to reduce them to nothing.
Fifth, it helps to explain the apparent irrationality in the thinking and behavior of those who were not socialized in the cultural traditions of an expert observer. This improves the ability to communicate and interact with other actors.
Finally, understanding the variables of a strategic culture can be critical to the evaluation of scenarios and threats, as it enables us to grasp the nuances and understand the way the actor acts on large and mall issues.
D. Lantis in his article “Strategic culture: understanding the essence of the strategy from Clausewitz to constructivism” raised a number of key problems that are of fundamental importance for the theory and research in this field:
– Do different theories of strategic culture provide an adequate explanation for the choice of national security policy?
– Is the strategic culture characterized by a certain constancy or is it capable of developing over time?
— How much is it universal?
In 1977, Jack Schneider, developing the theory of strategic culture to explain Soviet military strategy, introduced a political and cultural element in research on security. D. Schneider suggested that the elites clearly articulate their views on the strategic culture associated with making decisions in the field of military security. This would serve to broaden the expression of public opinion by those who have a special strategic thinking. He argued that “as a result of this process, a number of common beliefs, attitudes and patterns of behavior regarding nuclear strategy have reached a semi-permanent state that determines their place and the level of a certain culture, not just politics. “Schneider’s article resonated in the analytical community that studies security issues. In subsequent works such as Ken Booth’s work” Strategy and Ethnocentrism “, the essence of nuclear strategy and relations between superpowers continued to be discussed. Gray also noted the difference of national strategy styles, conditioned by the specifics of historical experience. This conclusion helped characterize the adoption of strategic decisions in countries such as the US and the USSR. Gray gave the following definition of strategic culture: an appeal to ways of thinking and acting in solving the problems of the use of force, rooted in national historical experience, reflecting models of behavior in critical situations. K. Gray also took into account the development of civil society culture and its way of life. Like D. Schneider, K. Gray was of the opinion that strategic culture has a practically permanent impact on security policy. The ideas of both scholars drew attention to the role of internal conditions in shaping the political course of national security, however, according to a number of critics, the operationalization of the notion of strategic culture is inevitably subjective. In their opinion, the interrelation of the elements in certain strategic culture models is so strong that in it is almost impossible to isolate dependent and independent variables. For this reason, strategic culture is characterized by them as a tautological design. Critical researchers were also dissatisfied with the narrow applicability of various interpretations of the term in question. In this limitation, they saw similarities with anthropology. In addition, both supporters and opponents considered the strategic culture to be rather static, undeveloped development. Even those who supported the theory of strategic culture called for more cautious application of its provisions. Gray, for example, argued that sociology could not develop an accurate methodology for identifying national styles and cultures. Literature of the 80’s and 90’s. XX century. on an academically “unfashionable” subject of a national character at best resembled narratives, but K. Gray stubbornly adhered to his position and continued to explore national cultural thinking. It was in this that he saw critical importance for understanding the country’s foreign policy behavior. Booth called the formation of military strategy “a purely ethnocentric process,” and D. Klein argued that “a comparative, comprehensive study of the formation, impact and process of changing the strategic cultures of major world powers at the present time” should contribute to the study of the phenomenon of military policy. But all these disputes, for obvious reasons, subsided after the end of the Cold War.

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